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IRREDUCIBLE COMPLEXITY AND DARWINIAN
GRADUALISM: A REPLY TO MICHAEL J. BEHE
Paul Draper

In Darwin's Black Box, Michael). Behe argues that, because certain biochemical
systems are both irreducibly complex and very complex, it is extremely
unlikely that they evolved gradually by Darwinian mechanisms, and so
extremely likely that they were intelligently designed. I begin this paper by
explaining Behe's argument and defending it against the very common but
clearly mistaken charge that it is just a rehash of William Paley'S design argument. Then I critically discuss a number of more serious objections to the
argument. I conclude that, while Behe successfully rules out some Darwinian
paths to the biochemical systems he discusses, others remain open. Thus, his
argument against Darwinian gradualism (and ipso facto his argument for
intelligent design) is at best incomplete.

In Darwin's Black Box, Michael J. Behe 1 argues that, because certain biochemical systems are both irreducibly complex and very complex, it is
extremely likely they were designed by an intelligent agent. Behe, who is a
biochemist, wrote this book for a popular audience, and it has received a
great deal of attention, much of it quite positive, from the popular press. 2
Not surprisingly, it has also been ridiculed by many in the scientific community. Yet it has managed to impress a number of very good philosophers/ not, I suspect, because of its philosophical content, which is very
limited, but rather because it contains a new and interesting challenge to
Darwinism, which is arguably the most philosophically significant scientific theory ever formulated. My goal in this paper will be to show that,
while this challenge is both more original and, with a few modifications,
more powerful than many of Behe's critics realize, it is incomplete and for
that reason does not refute Darwinism.
I will divide the body of my paper into three main sections, followed by
a brief conclusion. In the first section, I will explain Behe's design argument. In the second, I will defend it against the very common but clearly
mistaken charge that it is just a rehash of William Paley'S design argument,
which Darwin refuted over a century ago. And in the third section, J will
critically discuss a number of more serious objections to Behe's argument.
Some of these objections can be answered by modifying his argument. But
others expose sizable holes in the argument, and I am unable to see how
Behe could fill them.
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Behe's design argument has two stages. The first stage, which is developed in the first two parts of his tripartite book, appeals to the existence of
biochemical "machines" in an attempt to show that Darwinism is very
probably false. It is important to be clear, however, on exactly what aspect
of Darwinism Behe is attacking. He disputes neither common ancestry nor
the operation of natural selection. Rather, it is Darwin's gradualism that
Behe rejects. Specifically, he attempts to meet a challenge that Darwin himself issued: "If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed,
which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight
modifications, my theory would absolutely break down."4 Of course, there
is an important connection between natural selection and gradualism.
Natural selection can work on small successive changes or on sudden big
changes, but, as Richard Dawkins has pointed out/ it cannot explain a complex system like the human eye unless it operates on a long series of small
changes. This is why Darwin says his theory would break down if it could
be shown that a complex organ could not have evolved gradually. If such
an organ appears suddenly, then it does not explain that organ's complexity to point out that the organ gave the organism in which it first appeared
an advantage in the struggle to survive and so through heredity became
increasingly common in the population to which that organism belonged.
So by attacking gradualism, Behe is attacking Darwin's view that natural
selection can explain biological complexity.
The second stage of Behe's argument, which is defended in the third
part of his book, attempts to show that, if certain biochemical systems were
not put together gradually, then it is highly probable they were designed
by one or more intelligent agents. This part of Behe's argument is not sufficiently developed to be of interest to philosophers. Hehe, keep in mind, is a
biochemist, and so his failure to discuss the logical details of his inference
from the falsity of Danvinian gradualism to the truth of intelligent design
is not surprising. He believes that the correctness of this inference is or
should be obvious (at least once complexity theory and symbiosis are ruled
out as alternative non-gradualist explanations) and for that reason does little (by philosophical standards) to defend it. 6 Thus, I will ignore this part
of Behe's argument, focusing instead on his very interesting challenge to
Darwinian gradualism.
Behe bases this challenge on the claim that certain biochemical systems
like the cilium and the blood clotting cascade are irreducibly complex-that is,
they are "composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of any of the parts causes
the system to effectively cease functioning" (p. 39). To help us understand
this definition, Behe provides a simple non-biological example: a mousetrap of the common household variety. This system fits his definition nicely. It is composed of several-five to be exact-interacting, well-matched
parts, all of which contribute to the basic function of the system, which is to
kill mice. Most importantly, the removal of any of the parts would cause
the system to cease functioning: a hammer is needed to deliver the killing
blow, a spring and holding bar are required to arm the hammer, a catch is
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crucial both for arming the hammer and for detecting the pressure of small
feet, and a platform is essential for anchoring the other parts.
How, according to Behe, does the existence of irreducibly complex biochemical systems show that Darwinian gradualism is false? His argument-as stated in the first part of his book-proceeds as follows. If gradualism is true, then these biochemical systems are produced either directly or
indirectly by slight, successive modifications of a precursor system. But
they "cannot be produced directly (that is, by continuously improving the
initial function, which continues to work by the same mechanism) by
slight, successive modifications of a precursor system, because any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing even a single part is by
definition nonfunctional" (p. 39; my emphasis). And while it is possible
that they are gradually produced indirectly-that is, via an evolutionary
path on which a change occurs either in the system's function or in the
mechanism by which the system performs its function-this is extremely
improbable because they are very complex: "As the complexity of an interacting system increases, . . . the likelihood of ... an indirect rou te drops
precipitously" (p. 40). Behe concludes that gradualism is very probably
false-it is highly unlikely that these biochemical systems are produced by
slight, successive modifications of a precursor system.
Notice that, in this initial statement of the argument, Behe uses the irreducibility of a system's complexity to rule out (as conceptually impossible)
direct evolutionary routes-that is, routes that do not involve a change in
function or mechanism-while the fact that a system is very complex-it has
very many parts (p. 4S)-is used to rule out (as highly improbable) indirect
evolutionary routes. Many of Behe's critics ignore this dual aspect of Behe's
argument when they offer alleged counterexamples to Behe's position that
Darwinian mechanisms did not produce the sort of systems he discusses.
Either they give examples of very complex systems that evolved gradually
but are not (at least so far as we can tell) irreducibly complex, or they give
examples of irreducibly complex systems that evolved gradually, but ignore
the fact that those systems do not exhibit a high degree of complexity.
An example of the first sort of mistake can be found in a reply to Behe
offered by Niall Shanks (a philosopher) and Karl H. Joplin (a biologist).?
They argue that complex biochemical systems typically exhibit considerable redwldancy, which implies that parts can be removed without a complete loss of function. Such redundancy also helps us to see how such systems could have evolved step by step. But Behe is not committed to claiming that all biochemical systems exhibit irreducible complexity or that no
biochemical systems evolved gradually in a Darwinian fashion. And
Shanks and Joplin offer no evidence that the biochemical systems to which
Behe appeals exhibit redundant complexity. Thus, no damage is done to
Behe's argument when they point out that other very complex biochemical
systems do exhibit redundant and hence reducible complexity and suggest
how those systems might have evolved gradually.'
An example of the second sort of mistake can be found in a recent book
by Kenneth R. Miller (a cell biologist), who tells the following well-known
Darwinian success story:
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The three smallest bones in the human body-the malleus, incus, and
stapes-carry sound vibrations across the middle ear, from the membrane-like tympanum (the eardrum) to the oval window. This fivecomponent system perfectly fits the criterion of irreducible complexity-if anyone of its parts is taken away or modified, hearing is lost.
This is the kind of system that evolution supposedly cannot produce,
since, as Behe has said, it would have to "arise as an integrated unit, in
one fell swoop." Unfortunately for design theorists, the fossil record
elegantly and precisely documents exactly how this system formed.
During the evolution of mammals, over several million years, two
of the bones that originally formed the rear portion of the reptilian
lower jaw were gradually pushed backwards and reduced in size until
they migrated into the middle ear, forming the bony connections that
carry vibrations into the inner ears of present-day mammals. This is an
example of a system of perfectly formed interlocking components,
specified by multiple genes, that was gradually refashioned and adapted for another purpose altogether-something that evolution's critics
[including, Miller believes, Behe] claim to be impossible.9
Miller concludes: "Remember Behe's statement that 'any precursor to an
irreducibly complex system that is missing a part is by definition nonfunctional'? Well, there's just no other word for it-that statement is wrong."l0
But Miller's example of the mammalian ear certainly does not justify this
conclusion. For Behe does not mean to rule out by definition functioning
precursors to irreducibly complex systems that are missing parts but serve
either a different function or the same function by a different mechanism.
And if Miller is right that the mammalian ear is irreducibly complex/ ' then
that is precisely what we have in the case of the malleus, incus, and stapes.
We have a perfect example of how it is possible, as Behe admits, for an irreducibly complex system to evolve gradually by an indirect route. One of the
three bones of the mammalian middle ear came from a reptilian ear, which
functioned by a different mechanism. The other two came from a reptilian
jaw, the function of which was obviously not to transmit sound vibrations.
Thus, if this example is any threat at all to Behe's argument, it is because
it provides evidence against Behe's claim that the indirect, gradual evolution of the biological systems he discusses is very unlikely. But it fails even
to do this. For even if the mammalian ear is irreducibly complex, it is not
the irreducible complexity of the systems Behe discusses that is supposed
to make their gradual indirect evolution unlikely, but rather their high
degree of complexity. And the mammalian ear has only five components.
Thus, though it may be irreducibly complex, it is not very complex, and
hence proof of its gradual indirect evolution does no damage to Behe's
argument. 12
II

Behe's critics have raised three main sorts of objections to his argument
against Darwinian gradualism. Some deny that the biochemical systems
upon which Behe bases his case are irreducibly complex. Some maintain
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that the indirect Darwinian evolution of these systems is not unlikely. And
some attack Behe's position on direct Darwinian routes-they claim that,
even without any change in function or mechanism, the gradual evolution
of an irreducibly complex system is possible. I will raise or discuss objections of all these sorts in Section III. But first, Twould like to defend Behe
against what is perhaps the most common criticism of his book.
Most reviewers complain that the book is unoriginal-that Behe has just
taken William Paley's old design argument and dressed it up in new biochemical clothing. For example, Peter Atkins (a chemist) claims that Behe's
'book is a tiresome reworking at the molecular level of the timeworn
"design argument. "m And Miller says that "Behe would like us to believe
that he has discovered a new biological principle called 'design.' But the
real news in Darwin's Black Box is not design.... It is, instead, that a classic
argument from the nineteenth century could be attractively rewrapped in
the shiny packaging of biochemistry." l4 Miller adds that Behe's argument
is doomed to fail, on the grounds that Paley's argument was refuted by
Darwin (and more recently by Dawkins).'s Both Atkins and Miller are
confident that what did not work at the level of the organism will not work
at the level of the celJ.1b Behe himself appears to lend credibility to this
charge by emphasizing the similarity of his argument to Paley's and by
contending that Paley's argument has never been refuted (p. 213). I
believe, however, that this charge is both misleading and unfair, especially
when used to justify pessimism about the success of Behe's argument.
Though the truth of my belief may already be obvious to anyone who has
read both Paley's Natural Theology and the first section of this paper, it is
nevertheless useful to compare Paley's argument to Behe's, both in order to
highlight certain distinctive features of Behe's argument and in order to
explain why Behe makes the provocative claim that Paley has never been
refuted.
Paley was even less interested in the logical details of his inference from
natural mechanical order to design than Behe is. He used an analogy to
defend his inference (his famous watch example l7), but obviously that's no
reason to think he intended his argument to be analogical. If we interpret
it instead as an instance of inference to the best available explanation, then
it can be summarized as follows:
1.

2.
3.

4.
So,
S.

Some natural systems (e.g. the human eye) are mechanically
ordered (i.e. they exhibit the same sort of order as watches and
other machines produced by human beings).
Intelligent design is a very good explanation of mechanical order.
No other explanation (or no equally good explanation) of
mechanical order is available.
Every instance of mechanical order has an explanation.
Some natural systems were (probably) intelligently designed.

According to Elliott Sober, this argument was not refuted until Darwin published his Origin of Species. Sober claims that, although Hume may have
refuted Paley'S argument, interpreted as an argument by analogy, Hume
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offered no alternative explanation of biological order, and so did not refute
Paley's argument, interpreted as an inference to the best available explanation. That refutation was not provided until Darwin showed that premise
(3) is false by providing a better explanation of mechanically ordered biological systems than intelligent design.'" Behe agrees with Sober that Hume
failed to refute Paley's argument (pp. 217-219), but denies that Darwin did
any better. Because mechanical order includes irreducible complexity,
Behe's argument against gradualism proves, in his opinion, that Darvvinian
explanations of very complex natural machines do not work. 19
But Behe's contribution to Paley's case for design is not limited to defending premise (3). Behe holds that Paley lacked clear examples of natural
machines. Paley's favorite examples were large biological structures like the
eye. Even if we ignore the (alleged) problem that such systems are typically
not discrete systems but rather contain a number of distinct subsystems,
each with its own special function (p. 38), Behe identifies a further (in my
opinion more serious) problem, namely, that the working parts of large biological systems like the eye typically include a very large number of different
types of molecules, and we cannot even list all of these molecules let alone
specify how they contribute to the function of such systems. It follows that
we don't know whether or not such systems are irreducibly complex (i.e.
whether or not they are "machines" in the relevant sense) and so, Behe concludes, don't know whether or not they evolved gradually (p. 41).
Some scientists have objected that a mousetrap is also composed of molecules, and yet "to see that a mousetrap is irreducibly complex, we don't have
to work out its chemistry.""] But those molecules are not working parts of the
mousetrap. Watchmakers at Paley'S time, who had no idea what a molecule
is,21 could list every single working part of a watch and explain how each
contributes to the watch's function of keeping time, whereas biologists cannot do the same for the eye or its subsystems, even today. So Paley was in a
position to know that a watch is irreducibly complex, but we still don't know
whether or not the eye or its subsystems are. This is why biochemistry is
essential to Behe's argument. According to Behe, we now know that a number of discrete molecular systems are both very complex and irreducibly
complex: biochemists have identified the specific functions of these systems,
they can list all of their many well matched parts, and they know that those
parts are required for the systems to function (p. 41). This could not have
been done when Paley wrote or even when Darwin wrote, because, prior to
the second half of the 20th Century, the cell was still a "black box"-no one
even knew what its working parts were, let alone how they worked.
It is clear, then, that Behe has done more than just "spiff up" Paley's
design argument with some new molecular examples of biological order.
It is Behe's position that, while Paley has never been refuted-neither his
premises nor his inference have been shown to be defective-he still needs
help on two fronts. He needs a refutation of Darwinian explanations of
nahlral machines to show that his third premise is true, and he needs some
proven examples of natural machines to establish that his first premise is
true. Whether or not Behe's attempt to provide such help is ultimately successful, it is certainly original. For he emphasizes in a way Paley never did
both the idea that mechanical order includes irreducible complexity and
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the importance of this idea for Paley's inference from mechanical order to
design. Moreover, Behe attempts to refute Darwinian gradualism, which
is, of course, an opponent Paley never had to face. And while a large part
of Behe's book does involve presenting new biochemical examples of
mechanical order, this is accompanied by an argument for the conclusion
that such examples are needed-that Paley's examples did not clearly
demonstrate the existence of natural machines. Given all this, Behe's book
should certainly not be dismissed as unoriginal. It deserves to be carefully
evaluated.
III

A. Arc Behc's Systems Irreducibly Complex?
A number of biochemists and biologists, and even one or two philosophers,
challenge Behe's claim that the systems he discusses in the second part of
his book are irreducibly complex. Unfortunately, some of these challengers
insist on dtifining "irreducible complexity" as "complexity that cannot (or at
least did not) evolve gradually." On this definition, Behe's claim that some
biological systems are irreducibly complex becomes the conclusion of his
argument against gradualism rather than a premise. But some of those who
claim that Behe's systems are not irreducibly complex are careful to stick to
Behe's definition-they really do mean to be claiming that these systems can
function (though perhaps not as well) without some of their parts. For
example, Miller2 challenges Behe's claim that the sort of cilium discussed
by Behe is irreducibly complex by pointing out that comparative studies on
a wide variety of organisms show that the common "textbook" claim that
the only working cilia have nine pairs of microtubules surrounding two
central microtubules is false. Tn fact, some function with only three outer
pairs of rnicrotubules and no central microtubules. 23 David W. Ussery (a
biochemist) points out that, while Behe claims that the bacterial flagellum
requires over forty proteins to function, some bacteria have functioning flagella composed of only 33 proteins, and these fully functional simpler flagella may be able to function well enough to be useful to a bacterium with
still fewer parts. Ussery also challenges Behe's claim that certain cellular
transport systems are irreducibly complex, citing as evidence the much simpler transport systems found in bacterial cells. 24 Finally, one does not have
to be a biologist to realize that the antibody-diversity system, which is one
of three subsystems of the immune system that Behe claims to be irreducibly complex, would not "effectively cease to function" if a few antibody
molecules were removed from it. 25
Additional support for this objection comes (unintentionally) from Behe
himself. For a careful reading of the second part of his book reveals that he
rarely even claims let alone proves that all of the parts of the systems he
discusses are required for those systems to function. His first two examples are the cilium and the flagellum, which he says are systems of "staggering complexity, with dozens or even hundreds of precisely tailored
parts" (p. 73). But are all of these parts necessary for cilia and flagella to
function? In the case of the cilium, Behe makes no effort to defend an affirmative answer to this question. Instead, he argues for the necessity of
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three parts (microtubules for paddling, dynein arms to serve as motors,
and nexin arms to transmit the force of the motors to the paddles), and
then claims that ''It is very likely that many of the parts we have not considered here are required for any cilium to function in a cell" (p. 73; my
emphases). In the case of the bacterial flagellum, he does claim that it
requires more than forty proteins to function, but he does not defend that
claim and, as we shall see, implicitly admits that it is false in a later paper.
Behe's third example of an irreducibly complex system is the vertebrate
blood clotting system. Behe specifies the system's components (over two
dozen proteins), but instead of showing that they are all required for the
system to function, Behe admits that the details of much of this very complex system are not very well known. Indeed, there is a fork in the pathway
(traced backwards), which suggests that part of the system exhibits redundant and hence reducible complexity. And though he says that "the entire
blood dotting system is irreducibly complex" (p. 87; my emphasis), what he
actually argues for is that the four components of the part of the system that
is well known-the part after the fork in the pathway-are all required for the
system to work (p. 86). He also claims that each step in the pathway is irreducibly complex, since each step requires both a proenzyme and an activating enzyme to switch on the proenzyme (p. 87).
Behe's four other examples also fall short of the expectations created by
his definition of "irreducible complexity." He claims that transporting proteins from one part of the cell to another for disposal from the cell involves
the services of dozens of proteins (pp. 106-108), but then says that less than
ten components are necessary (pp. 109-110). He also claims that three subsystems of the immune system-clonal selection, antibody diversity, and
the complement system-are each irreducibly complex. 26 But once again,
Behe does not even try to show that all of the functioning parts of these
systems are necessary. Instead, though he wouldn't put it this way, he
seems to defend the position that these systems in some sense contain irreducible complexity. For example, he points out that the complement system is a cascade that, like the blood-clotting cascade, includes steps that
require each of two components to ftmction.
The bottom line is that Behe doesn't deliver in the second part of his
book what he promised in the first part. Both his definition of "irreducible
complexity" and his example of the five part mousetrap suggest that, in an
irreducibly complex system, all of the interacting parts that contribute to
the system performing its function are required for that function. This is
also spelled out very clearly when he describes the two steps for determining if a system is irreducibly complex. The first step, he says, is to identify
the system's function and its components-i.e. the parts of the system that
contribute to its function. "The second step ... is to ask if all of the components are required for the function" (p. 42; my emphasis). Thus, Behe fails
to live up to his own standards for determining that a system is irreducibly
complex. The systems upon which he bases his case contain parts that contribute to the system's fw1Ction, yet either are not essential for that function
or at least have not been shown by Behe to be so.
In a paper published after the book, Behe in effect changes his definition
of "irreducible complexity" so as to avoid this particular problem. In
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response to Ussery's claim that flagella can function with fewer than forty
proteins, he says that "some systems may have parts that are necessary for a
function, plus other parts that, while useful, are not absolutely required.
Although one can remove the radio from a car and the car will still work,
one can't remove the battery or some other parts and have a working car.""
His example here is a bit off the mark, since a car's radio does not contribute
to a car's (most obvious) function and so is not a "component" of the system
in the relevant sense. But replace "radio" with "tires" and the example
makes the point he wants. Although not all of the parts of a car that contribute to its function are required for that function, many are, and for that
reason the car qualifies as an irreducibly complex system. Notice that, by
responding to Ussery in this way, Behe in effect admits that his original
claim that forty proteins are required for a bacterial flagellum to function is
false. But more importantly, this response presupposes a new definition of
"irreducible complexity," one that implies that a system is irreducibly complex even if it has working parts that are not essential for it to function, so
long as it has (at least) two interacting and closely matched parts which are
essential. Given this definition, it would seem that the biochemical svstems
Behe discusses are indeed irreducibly complex.
~
This change in definition, however, does not solve the real problem
here, which is that, while Behe (on the new definition) has provided examples of systems that are both irreducibly complex and very complex, he has
not proven that these systems are irreducibly very complex. This is a problem because great complexity that is reducible is not an insurmountable
obstacle for direct Darwinian evolution, and the irreducible complexity of a
relatively simple system (like the mammalian ear) is not an insurmountable obstacle for indirect Darwinian evolution. Thus, even if Behe is right
that a direct Darwinian path cannot produce irreducible complexity and an
indirect Darwinian path is very unlikely to produce a high degree of complexity, this leaves open the very real possibility of an indirect Darwinian
path producing an irreducibly complex minimal system and then a direct
path adding to that system all of the extra complexity that improves the
system's function but is not necessary for it.
I do not know how Behe would respond to this new objection. Perhaps
he could show that some of the systems he discusses have sufficiently
many required components to rule out as unlikely an indirect route's producing the minimal system. Or perhaps he could appeal to other reasons
besides great complexity to rule out as unlikely the production of the minimal system by indirect evolution. This second sort of reply, it might be
argued, is already implicit in Behe's book. For although his argument as
stated in the first part of his book appeals only to great complexity in order
to rule out indirect routes, we shall see in the next section that, when he
actually applies his reasoning to the various systems he discusses in the
second part of the book, great complexity (in the sense of a multiplicity of
parts) is not the only nor even the chief reason he offers for rejecting indirect routes. Unfortunately for Behe, however, we shall also see that his
chief reason-the specificity of the parts of the system-does not rule out
every sort of indirect route.'"
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B. Are Indirect Routes Improbable?
Recall that indirect evolutionary routes are ones involving a change in function or a change in mechanism. The simpler a system, the more likely it is
that indirect evolution by itself could account for that system. Behe sometimes seems to forget this fact. Consider, for example, his argument for the
conclusion that a new two-part step in the blood clotting cascade could not
be added in a Darwinian fashion to a simpler cascade. He correctly points
out that the probability of both parts appearing even close to simultaneously is negligibly low. Thus, realistically, one of the parts would have to be
introduced first. But then, in an effort to reach the conclusion that the part
that appears first would disappear long before the arrival of the other part,
he claims that at best the first part would do nothing and so would not be
selected (p. 87). This claim, however, fails to establish the desired conclusion for two reasons. First, even if it is true, the first part might appear coincidentally in an organism that is for other reasons the fittest and thus might
persist despite doing nothing. 2Y Second, Behe fails to show that the claim is
true, that the first part would do nothing. For from the fact that, for example, a new inactive proenzyme would not by itself contribute to blood clotting, it doesn't follow that it would do nothing. It might very well perform
some other function, resulting in its selection. Then, when the necessary
activating enzyme appeared, both could be "recruited" as a new step in the
blood clotting cascade. (Actually, given gene duplication, for which much
evidence exists in the case of the blood clotting cascade, the performance of
new functions does not imply that old functions cease to be performed,
making such indirect paths even easier to travel.)
Of course, Behe may have good reasons based on biological details of
which I am ignorant for believing that such indirect routes are very unlikely in this specific case. But he does not tell us what these reasons are.
Instead, he often challenges his critics to explain in detail exactly how the
system in question evolved. I certainly cannot do that-indeed, maybe no
one can at this time. But I do not claim to be able to prove that Darwinism
explains the development of these systems. Rather, it is Behe who claims
he can show that no such explanation exists. And obviously the fact that
no one can specify all of the specific steps in the evolution of these systems
does not show that the sort of indirect route discussed above did not produce them.
Another worry I have about Behe's analysis of indirect routes is that,
while there are many different sorts of indirect Darwinian routes, Behe discusses only one at any length. I will begin by examining what he says
about that one, and then show that his reasons for rejecting it fail to rule
out a different sort of indirect route. The type of indirect path to which he
gives most of his attention is one on which the required parts of an irreducibly complex system evolve separately for different purposes but then
unite in the service of a single new function. Keep in mind that he admits
such routes are possible. A system S which performs some function F
might gradually evolve despite having more than one required component
if those components evolve separately (at different times), each serving
some distinct function other than F, and then, when all of the parts of S are
present, they begin to interact with each other, forsaking their old functions
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(which might not be as beneficial as F or might continue to be performed
because of some sort of redundancy) for the sake of F.
Behe holds that such paths are very unlikely to account for the systems
he discusses (even if those systems have very few required parts) because
the parts of those systems are precisely tailored to each other. Indeed, Behe
builds such tailoring into his definition of "irreducible complexity." To
assert that a system is irreducibly complex is to assert, not just that the system is complex and irreducibly so, but also that its parts are "well
matched" or "precisely tailored" or "highly specified." What this means is
that the parts of any irreducibly complex system are able to interact with
each other in the way needed for the system to function as well as it does
only because they possess a number of very specific properties. Again, the
mousetrap is a good example. Its parts are very well matched in the sense
that even relatively minor changes in their shape, size, or other characteristics would result in the system's failing to function or failing to function as
well. For example, if the holding bar were even slightly shorter, the hammer could not be armed, and hence no mice would be killed. Or if the
spring were wound less tightly, perhaps only small or sickly mice would
be killed by the hammer's blow.
According to Behe, the problem that such specificity creates for indirect
evolution is analogous to the problem one would face if one tried to make
a mousetrap from parts that served other purposes:
In your garage you might have a piece of wood from an old Popsicle
stick (for the platform), a spring from an old wind-up clock, a piece of
metal (for the hammer) in the form of a crowbar, a darning needle for
the holding bar, and a bottle cap that you fancy to use as a catch. But
these pieces couldn't form a functioning mousetrap without extensive modification, and while the modification was going on, they
would be unable to work as a mousetrap. (p. 66)
What Behe either does not realize or neglects to make explicit, however, is
that specificity alone does not suffice to rule out as unlikely a crucial role
for the sort of indirect route under consideration. For suppose the precise
tailoring of the parts of a system enables it to function better than it otherwise would, but is not required for it to function. Then parts that, because
they previously served different purposes, are not precisely tailored to
each other could nevertheless begin to function as a system (and be
required for that system to function); and then direct evolution could over
time improve the system's performance by gradually tailoring the parts
until eventually the system becomes irreducibly complex by Behe's definition-it is made up of precisely tailored parts, at least two of which are
required for the system to function.
So what Behe needs to rule out the sort of indirect route being considered is a system that cannot function at all unless its parts are well
matched. He needs, in other words, not just specificity, but what I will call
"irreducible specificity." To claim that the specificity of a system is irreducible is, roughly, to claim that the system would effectively cease to
function if its parts were modified. This definition is, however, only a first
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approximation, because it treats irreducible specificity as a qualitative concept, whereas in reality it is quantitative-it comes in degrees. No system is
such that any modification of its parts, no matter how slight, would result
in a total loss of function. For instance, some changes could be made to the
parts of a mousetrap that either would not affect how many mice it kills or
would make it a less effective but not completely ineffective trap. (For
example, the platform could be larger or the spring could be wound slightly looser.) Yet we would still want to say that the mousetrap exhibits a
high degree of irreducible specificity because so many relatively small
changes in the size, shape, or even composition of its parts would result in
a total loss of function. Thus, the crucial issue is whether the parts of
Behe's biochemical systems exhibit a sufficiently high degree of irreducible
specificity to rule out as unlikely indirect routes in which parts that evolve
separately for different purposes unite to form a system with a new function. I suspect they do, but I lack the scientific expertise to make confident
judgments about such matters.
Unfortunately for Behe, however, not even (a high degree of) irreducible
specificity can rule out as unlikely a different sort of indirect Darwinian
route. The sort of route I have in mind occurs when an irreducibly complex and irreducibly specific system S that serves function F evolves from a
precursor S* that shares many of 5' s parts but serves a different function F*.
Notice that parts that Sand S* share and that are required for 5 to perform
F need not be required for S* to perform F* even if they contribute to F*,
and parts that are irreducibly specific relative to F may be only reducibly
specific relative to F*. Thus, both S* and the specificity of its parts may
have been gradually produced via a direct evolutionary path. Then one or
more additional parts are added to 5*, resulting in a change of function
from f* to F. And relative to F, the parts and their specificity, which had
not been essential for F*, are now essential.
Once again, it is possible that Behe has good reasons for believing that
this sort of indirect route is very improbable; but if he does, he has not told
us what they are. For we have already seen that great complexity (in the
sense of a multiplicity of parts) will not help rule out a crucial role for indirect routes like this if most of that complexity is reducible, for then a direct
route can add that complexity to a minimal system that was produced
indirectly. But even if a system is irreducibly very complex, it is not clear
why that would make this sort of indirect route unlikely. Behe does offer
additional reasons for rejecting indirect Darwinian paths that are based on
the individual features of the systems he discusses. For example, he argues
that certain parts of the cellular transport system would actually be harmful to the cell if they were isolated from the other parts of the system (p.
112). But these reasons do not by themselves eliminate the sort of indirect
path under consideration. 50 Behe clearly owes us an argument.
(Additional arguments are needed to rule out indirect routes involving
changes in mechanism.)
C. Are Direct Routes Impossible?
Recall that .Behe holds that, whether a system has only two parts or a hundred, its production by a direct Darwinian route is impossible if it is irre-
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ducibly complex. His argument is quite simple. Suppose that parts A and
B are each required for some system to perform its function F. Then without some change in function or mechanism, it is impossible for Darwinian
evolution to produce that system by first producing A and then later
adding B (or vice versa). For that would require that A be preserved until
B appears. But without B, A will not perform some function other than F
since we are assuming no change in function and A will not perform F
because B is required for F to be performed. Thus, A will perform no function at all, which means A will not be selected and so will not be around
when B appears.
I believe that this is a bad argument for several reasons. To distinguish
these reasons, it is helpful to distinguish two different types of direct paths.
The first, which I will call a simple direct path, occurs when there is no
change in function or mechanism (making the path direct) and, while parts
are added along the way, no parts are subtracted (making the path simple).
The second, which I will call a complicated direct path, occurs when there is
no change in function or mechanism, but parts are both added and subtracted along the way. There is a sense, of course, in which such a path is
"more circuitous" or "less direct" than a simple direct path. But keep in
mind that, for Behe, directness depends only on there being no change in
function or mechanism. So what 1 am caUing a complicated direct path is
indeed direct by his definition. (Notice we could also distinguish simple
and complicated indirect paths if we were so inclined.)
The possibility of an irreducibly complex system's being produced by a
complicated direct path is fairly obvious. For example, an irreducibly complex two-part system AB that performs function F could evolve directly as
follows. Originally, Z performs F, though perhaps not very well. (This is
possible because, from the fact that AB cannot perform F without A or B, it
doesn't follow that Z cannot perform F by itself.) Then A is added to Z
because it improves the function, though it is not necessary. B is also
added for this reason. One now has a reducibly complex system composed
of three parts, Z, A and B. Then Z drops out, leaving only A and B. And
without Z, both A and B are required for the system to function. 3D
One might object that in this scenario AB is not really produced directly
because, although the route from Z to AB involves no change in function, it
must involve a change in mechanism since interaction behveen two distinct parts is essential to AB's mechanism and so Z cannot function by the
same mechanism as AB. If this is right, then no complex system of interacting parts, whether irreducibly complex or not, could evolve both gradually
and directly from scratch. An indirect route would always be required in
order to get started. But that's no problem for this model. For I can simply
stipulate that Z itself is composed of hvo parts (Zl and Z2), which do perform AB's function by the same mechanism, and then add that Zl drops
out first, followed by Z2. Of course, Behe has not told us anything about
how he individuates mechanisms. But surely he cannot require identity of
parts in order to have identity of mechanism. (Otherwise his claim that
direct routes are impossible would be trivial.) Furthermore, there is no reason why an indirect Darwinian route could not produce Z, since it has only
two parts and, we may suppose, is not irreducibly specific. For example,
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perhaps Z1 originally performed F by itself, but by a different mechanism.
Then a mutation produced Z2, which united with Z1 to better perform F,
but by a new mechanism-the same mechanism used by AB.
Another possible objection to this model of a complicated direct route is
that it ignores the irreducible specificity of the parts of the systems Behe
discusses. But adding that AB is irreducibly specific will not make its complicated direct evolution impossible. For from the fact that AB is irreducibly specific it doesn't follow that ZAB is. Maybe ZAB was able to perform F before A and B were precisely tailored to each other. Then A and B
gradually became more specific because that improved the function of
ZAB. And finally, with the loss of Z, that specificity becomes essential for
AB to function.
One final objection to this model is that it explains why parts are added,
but it does not explain why they drop out. One cannot just appeal to random variation here, because the issue is not why Z might disappear in one
organism, but why its absence would become normal for a whole population of organisms. This too, however, is easy to explain. Just as adding a
part can be advantageous to an organism and for that reason make that
organism more likely to reproduce, so can eliminating a part. For example,
if AB functions better than ZAB or requires less energy to produce or maintain, then organisms with the simpler system may very well have an advantage over organisms with the more complicated system. Thus, natural
selection can result in a biological system's becoming, not just more complex, but also less complex (and in some cases simultaneously more
"machine-like"). In this way, irreducibly complex and specific systems
could evolve directly from systems that are reducibly complex and specific.
So a complicated direct Darwinian route to irreducible complexity is
clearly possible. But what is perhaps not so obvious is that even simple
direct routes are possible, at least on the most natural interpretation of
Behe's definition of "irreducible complexity." According to that definition, a system is irreducibly complex if its parts (or at least two of them) are
required for it to function. The most natural interpretation of what he
means by this is that, if any of those required parts were removed from the
contemporary system-i.e. if they were removed right now-the system would
cease to function. This is the natural interpretation because he defends his
claims of irreducible complexity by an appeal to what would happen to
contemporary organisms if parts were removed from their biochemical
systems. But if this is the correct interpretation, then Behe is mistaken in
thinking that it follows necessarily from the assumption that a system is
irreducibly complex that no precursor could perform the same function. In
other words, his claim that "any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing [an essential] part is by definition nonfunctional" (p. 39)
is false, and not just because the precursor might have parts not in the contemporary system (i.e. not just because of the possibility of complicated
direct routes). One reason for this is that some of the parts of the precursor
might have properties that are different from the properties those parts
have in the contemporary system, properties that enable the precursor to
perform the same function as the contemporary system without some of
the parts that are essential in that system. A second reason is that the pre-
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cursor might have an environment that is different from the environment
of the contemporary system. A part that is required for a system to function in one environment may not be required in another.
Behe's mousetrap example can be used to illustrate these points. This
system is irreducibly complex because, as Behe says, it needs all five of its
parts in order to kill mice. But it doesn't follow that no precursor to such a
trap that was missing a part ever killed mice. For example, a precursor
trap lacking a catch might still have worked if the properties of its holding
bar (specifically, its shape) differed in the right sort of way from the properties of a contemporary holding bar. In the contemporary trap, the catch
is needed both to arm the hammer and to detect the presence of a mouse
on the platform. But a bent holding bar can arm a hammer without a
catch, and if one is careful to arm it very insecurely, then even the movement of the trap caused by a mouse walking on its platform can cause the
hammer to be released.31 Thus, a precursor trap might still have killed
mice, at least occasionally, despite lacking one of the parts that is essential
in the contemporary trap. It would not have worked as well as the contemporary trap, but that, of course, is not the issue.
Another possibility is that the environment of the precursor trap was different in some crucial respect. For example, suppose that humans used to
feed mice by hand and as a result many mice would boldly approach any
human being who was holding food. Then the current mousetrap might
have had as a functioning precursor a trap lacking two of its parts. Neither
a catch nor a holding bar would have been needed because one could have
just held the hammer back and then released it when the cooperative little
rodent ran over for a handout. 32 Of course, the immediate "environments"
of biochemical systems are other biological systems. Biochemical systems
are subsystems of larger biological systems which in tum are subsystems of
still larger systems and so on. And given that all of these systems change
over time, it is certainly possible that a system that cannot work in you or me
without some part could have worked in our distant ancestors without that
part. Admittedly, I have given no rcallife examples, but Behe is the one trying to rule out functioning precursors by definition.
Behe might try to refute my claim that simple direct routes are possible
by claiming that I have misinterpreted his definition of "irreducible complexity." Specifically, he might say that his claim that a part is "required"
for function means that the system will not work without it in any (realistic) environment and no matter what properties the other parts of the system might (realistically) have. I have no quarrel with Behe interpreting his
definition in this way. But once again, this will not solve the real problem.
Instead, it will just shift the problem to Behe's premise that the biochemical
systems he discusses really are irreducibly complex. As even the mousetrap example at least suggests, it will now be much more difficult to establish that this premise is true. This is especially so because we do not know
for sure what our distant ancestors were like. We cannot examine them in
a lab, and there is no fossil record of their biochemical systems. Indeed,
they may represent biology's ultimate "black boxes."
Since my objections concerning both complicated and simple direct
routes establish only conceptual possibilities rather than probabilities, I
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believe Behe's most promising reply to these objections would be to admit
the possibility of direct routes to irreducible complexity, but claim that, like
indirect routes, they are very unlikely to produce the specific biochemical
systems on which Behe builds his case. Of course, it would not be enough
for Behe simply to claim that direct routes to these systems are very unlikely; he would need to argue for that claim. And it is an open question
whether or not a good argument is available.
IV

I have shown in this paper that, while Behe's challenge to Darwinian gradualism is both original and interesting, it is incomplete. The number of
possible Darwinian routes to irreducible complexity is greater than Behe
realizes. His arguments successfully rule out as very unlikely some routes,
but a number of direct, indirect, and mixed routes are not eliminated. I
myself doubt that further argument can eliminate all of them, but whether
or not I am right about that remains to be seen.
A defender of Behe might respond that the improbability of all
Darwinian paths is established by the silence of the scientific literature on
the issue of how Behe's systems evolved. Behe himself places great
emphasis on this silence, devoting an entire chapter of his book to it. And
though some of his critics have suggested that the literature is not as silent
as Behe would like us to think, I suspect that Behe is correct that no one has
even a good guess, or at least not a very specific one, about how systems
like the cilium or anti-body diversity might have evolved. Should we conclude, then, that this silence provides substantial indirect evidence for
Behe's position that Darwinism cannot explain the development of these
systems? In other words, is it likely that the literature would be much
noisier if Behe's position were false?
I am inclined to give negative answers to these questions for two reasons. first, the discipline of biochemistry is very young. Its focus has been
and for the most part still is on figuring out how biochemical systems
work. If, after a great deal more effort is put into discovering the origin of
these systems, Darwinians still make no progress, then I will be more
impressed. 33 Second, any indirect evidence that the silence of the literature
provides in support of Behe's position is offset by indirect evidence against
Behe's position. For in assessing the probability that some system evolved
gradually, one cannot just examine the specifics of that system. One must
also consider what we kIlOW about how other systems evolved. And Behe
admits, as well he should, that much evolutionary change is both gradual
and driven by Darwinian mechanisms. These Darwinian success stories
raise the probability that Darwinian evolution produced Behe's biochemical systems, even if we cannot yet specify step by step exactly how that
happened. They may not raise this probability much, but surely they raise
it at least as much as the silence of the literature on biochemical evolution
lowers it. 34
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NOTES

1. Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challl'nge to Evolution (New York:
The Free Press, 1996). Page numbers in parentheses in the text refer to this
book.
2. For example, Behe's book has been discussed in Newsweek, U.S. News
and World Report, the Nl'W York Times, and the National [<-eview.
3. Behe's position has been defended publicly by William Lane Craig,
William Dembski and William Hasker, and Behe has been a featured speaker
at several philosophy conferences.
4. TIll' Origin of Spl'cies (New York: The New American Library, 1958), p.
171; quoted by Behe on p. 39; my emphasis.
5. River Out of Edell (New York: Basic Books, 1995), p. 83; the relevant passage is quoted by Behe on p. 40.
6. Behe compares the situation of scientists searching for an explanation of
the development of life to a room in which an elephant (intelligent design)
stands next to a flattened body while detectives desperately search for clues to
the identity of the perpetrator (pp. 192-193). In fairness to Behe, however, I
should also note that he defends his inference to intelligent design against a
number of objections.
7. "Redundant Complexity: A Critical Analysis of Intelligent Design in
Biochemistry," Philosophy ofScicnce 66 (June, 1999), 268-282.
8. Behe makes this point in the last section of "Self-Organization and
Irreducibly Complex Systems: A Reply to Shanks and Joplin," Philosophy of
Science 67 (March, 2000), 155-162.
9. Finding Darwin's Cod (New York: Cliff Street Books, 1999), pp. 138-139;
my emphasis.
10. Ibid., p. 139.
11. Behe says that almost all large biological systems are composed of discrete subsystems (p. 38) and for that reason will not count as irreducibly complex by his definition. But the mammalian ear, or more specifically the three
bones whose specific function it is to transmit sound waves from the tympanum to the oval window, may be an exception.
12. Miller also offers a number of other examples, including two molecular
ones that he believes provide "a head-on refutation of Behe's assertion that
evolution cannot account for the development of complex biochemical systems" (Finding Darwin's God, p. 150). The first (p. 149) is the cytochrome c oxidase protein pump, which has six parts, and the second (pp. 150-152) is the
Krebs cycle, a metabolic pathway that, according to Miller, has twelve required
parts. The problem with these two examples is that neither system has a very
large number of parts. Of course, what exactly counts as a single functioning
part of these systems is somewhat problematic. But, as described by Miller,
these systems are relatively simple; so their indirect evolution does not undermine Behe's claim that very complex systems are extremely unlikely to evolve
gradually via an indirect route.
13. <http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/peter_atkins/behe.htm1> .
14. Finding Darwin's God, p. 134.
15. Ibid., p. 135.
16. Ibid., p. 136.
17. Natural Theology: Or, Evidences of the Existe1lce mzd Attributes of the Deity,
Collected From the Appearances of Nature (Houston, Texas: St. Thomas Press,
1972), ch. 1.
18. Elliott Sober, Plzilosophy of Biology (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,
1993), pp. 34-35. Richard Dawkins holds a similar view; see The Blind
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Watchmaker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1985), p. 5.
19. Behe's defense of premise (3) also includes a critique of two non-gradualist alternatives to intelligent design, complexity theory and symbiosis (pp.
187-192).
20. H. Allen Orr, "Darwin v. Intelligent Design (Again)," Boston Review 21.6
(Dec/Jan 97) <http://www-polisci.mit.edu/bostonreview /BR21.6/orr.html>.
21. The idea of molecules as distinct from atoms was first suggested by
Amedeo Avogadro in 1811, nine years after the publication of Paley's Natural

Theology.
22. Actually, even Miller strays from Behe's definition on occasion. He
tends to vacillate between claiming that irreducible complexity can and often
does evolve gradually and claiming that, because certain complex biochemical
systems do evolve gradually, they are not irreducibly complex. An example of
the latter sort of claim occurs when he asserts that "the notion of irreducible
complexity is nonsense," on the grounds that "Evolution assembles complex
biochemical machines ... from smaller working assemblies that are adapted to
fit novel functions" (Finding Darwin's God, p. 150).
23. Finding Darwin's God, pp. 140-143.
24. "A Biochemist's Response to 'The Biochemical Challenge to
Evolution,'" <http://www.cbs.dtu.dk/dave/Behe_text.html>.This is a longer
and updated version of a review of Behe's book published in Bios 70,40-45.
25. Behe also devotes a chapter of his book to the synthesis of AMP, but
since he claims that this system is not irreducibly complex, his argument that it
could not evolve gradually is distinct from the main argument of the book, and
so is beyond the scope of this paper.
26. The immune system is made up of four subsystems, self-toleration
being the fourth. Although all four are required for the immune system as a
whole to function, Behe never claims that the immune system as a whole is
irreducibly complex, presumably because it is not a discrete system (pp. 138139).
27. "Philosophical Objections to Intelligent Design: Response to Critics,"
<http://discovery .org/ embeddedRecentArticles. php3?id=445>.
28. I have been equating "very complex" with "has very many parts"
because, in the first part of his book, Behe says, "The systems I discuss are complex because they contain many components" (p. 48; my emphasis). But perhaps this interpretation is incorrect. Perhaps, when Behe claims in the first part
of his book that, as the complexity of an interacting system increases, the probability of an indirect route decreases, he intends degree of complexity to
depend, not just on the number of parts in the system, but also on how specific
or well matched those parts are. The advantage of this interpretation is that
the apparent shift in emphasis from multiplicity of parts in the first part of
Behe's book to specificity of parts in the second turns out not to be reaL The
advantage of my interpretation is that it emphasizes the distinction between
these two different ways in which a system can be "complicated," which is
important because they suggest different arguments for the position that indirect routes are improbable.
29. This possibility was pointed out to me by Carl Craver.
30. The main point of two articles on Behe's book by H. Allen Orr (an evolutionary biologist) is, I believe, that complicated direct paths to irreducible
complexity are possible. Though Orr's description of a direct path to irreducible complexity in his first article ("Darwin v. Intelligent Design (Again)")
could be interpreted in more than one way, he clearly suggests a complicated
direct path in the second article when, referring to Behe's mousetrap example,
he says, "under the Darwinian scenario, all the parts can change through time
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and there's no reason to think we started with anything like a holding bar,
spring, or platform" ("H. Allen Orr Responds," Boston Review 22.1 [Feb/Mar
97]; <http://www-polisci.mit.edu/ bostonreview /br22.1/ orr.html». Orr's
point is echoed by numerous critics who make an analogy to the building of a
stone arch, which requires scaffolding that is removed once the arch is complete.
31. These claims are easy to demonstrate. Simply remove the catch from a
trap and bend the holding bar so that (roughly) the middle of it can be placed
just barely under the tip of the slightly curved end of the spring that extends
under the hammer when it is armed. This will make it possible to arm the
hammer without a catch, and the closer to the tip of the spring the holding bar
is placed, the more insecurely the hammer will be armed. Additionally, one
can make the trap even more sensitive to pressure on the platform by allowing
the end of the holding bar to extend below the platform when the hammer is
armed (so that the platform will not lie flat on the floor when the trap is set). If
all this is done correctly, even very light pressure on the platform will cause
the hammer to be released.
32. One might object that the ancestral trap has just as many parts as its
descendent, because a human hand performs the role of the holding bar and a
human visual system takes the place of the catch. But since the original trap
required these human components to set the trap, the ancestral trap is still simpler.
33. This point has been made in a paper published on the internet that I
cannot now locate. My apologies to the author, whose name I cannot remember.
34. I am grateful to Craig Delancey, Bruce Hauptli, Jeffrey James Jordan,
William J. Wainwright, an anonymous Faith and Philosophy referee, and especially to Carl Craver and William Hasker for very helpful comments on earlier
versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Jeffrey Jay Lowder for referring me
to several relevant articles published on the internet.

